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Abstract. It is well known that uncertainty concerning firms’ costs as well as market 
power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose envi-
ronmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in most actual 
regulation settings the policy maker has to face both of these complications simultane-
ously. However, hitherto environmental economic theory has restricted to either of 
them when submitting conventional policy instruments to a comparative analysis. The 
article at hand takes a first step in closing this gap. It investigates the welfare effects of 
emission standards and taxes against the background of uncertain emission control 
costs and various degrees of the polluting firms’ market power. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The starting point of the present paper is the environmental problem in terms of exter-
nal diseconomies. More precisely, it considers the standard case of several firms emit-
ting a harmful pollutant in the course of their production and thus causing external 
damage costs. Trying to internalise the latter, the policy maker – below for simplifica-
tion referred to as environmental policy agency (short EPA) – will frequently face the 
following two complications: Firstly, it is not equipped with all the information required 
to generate the welfare maximising allocation. Secondly, the polluting firms exhibit 
market power at least to some extent. Environmental economists realised at an early 
stage that these hitches crucially influence the optimal1 design and choice of emission 
control instruments. One stream of literature, initiated by the seminal papers of Weitz-
man (1974) along with Adar and Griffin (1976), dealt with the question how uncertainty 
concerning damage and emission control costs affects the relative performance of 
emission standards, tradable emission licences and emission taxes. They showed that 
an additive shock to the marginal damage cost function lets the basically given equiva-
lence of these instruments unaffected,2 while a congruent shock to the marginal control 
cost function makes their comparative advantage dependant on the relative slopes of 
the two aforesaid marginal cost functions.3 Another branch of literature analyses how 
market power affects internalisation strategies. Buchanan (1969) started the discussion 
by pointing out that Pigouvian taxation might lead to suboptimal allocations when the 
polluting firms possess market power, which means an additional distortion to the ex-
ternal diseconomies of pollution. A further milestone was set by Barnett (1980), who 
derived a rigorous (second best) Pigouvian tax rule tailored to the actuality of a mo-
nopolistic polluter, followed by more sophisticated rules for symmetric (Ebert 1992) as 
well as asymmetric Cournot oligopoly (Simpson 1995). However, there were very few 
attempts to compare emission control instruments against the background of market 
power, like e.g. Requate (1993a and b) undertook. 
All in all, the review of the respective literature reveals a considerable shortfall: It has 
very well been detected that both information problems on the part of the EPA and 
market power of the polluting firms play an essential role for the optimal design and 
choice of environmental policy instruments (Requate, 2005, pp. 85ff). However, it has 
been constantly ignored that they emerge in virtually every real problem of environ-
mental regulation simultaneously. The article at hand takes a first step in closing this 
gap and shows that the interaction between information problems and market power 
has indeed an impact on optimal environmental policy. It compares two of the most 
common emission control instruments – standards and taxes4 – w.r.t. their welfare 
properties using a static partial framework. Thereby it assumes that the polluting firms 
                                                 
1
 In the remainder, “optimal” is used synonymously to “accomplishing the EPA’s goal of welfare maximisa-
tion”, if applicable subject to market power of the polluting firms and/or incomplete information. 
2
 Amongst others, the equivalence between standards, licences and taxes particularly presumes identical 
cost functions of the regulated firms; see e.g. Tisato (1994). 
3
 More precisely, the according policy rule first derived by Weitzman (1974) – in the following called the 
original Weitzman-rule – tells that the ranking of the mentioned instruments is determined by the relation of 
the marginal damage and the marginal minimised aggregate control cost function’s slope; see section 4. 
4
 Naturally it seems obvious to incorporate tradable licences which certainly belong to the most important 
conventional instruments. Yet a realistic modelling of the former would have to account for strategic effects 
on the licence market – due to firms’ market power – and thus go beyond the scope of the analysis. 
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have various degrees of market power on the output market and their control costs are 
uncertain from the EPA’s view. 
Section 2 sets up the model, whereupon section 3 displays the basic characteristics of 
the policy intervention game. In Section 4, the comparative analysis of emission stan-
dards and taxes starts out for the reference case of perfect competition and general-
ises the policy rule first derived by Weitzman (1974) by distinguishing two options of 
emission abatement. Section 5 continues the comparison of instruments for the market 
structure of symmetric Cournot oligopoly and provides the adequate modification of the 
original Weitzman-rule, while section 6 focuses on the relation between the degree of 
market power and the optimal instrument choice. Finally section 7 summarises results 
and gives a brief outlook on possible further research. 
The paper shows, that the EPA might choose the suboptimal instrument when it sticks 
to the original Weitzman-rule despite the incidence of market power, whereas an in-
crease of the latter leads to an augmentation of this risk. Furthermore, a modified policy 
rule is provided which guarantees the optimal instrument choice in the absence of poly-
polistic markets. Withal it is demonstrated, that monopolistic markets can be subsumed 
as a special case of the symmetric Cournot oligopoly in this regard. 
 
 
2. The model5 
 
Basic framework 
 
Consider n,...,1i =  symmetric firms each producing ix  units of a homogenous good at 
costs amounting to ( ) 2ii x21)x(cp = , whereas n is exogenously fixed. The price of the 
good is determined by the linear inverse market demand function ( ) bXaXp −= , given 
the aggregate output ∑= i ixX . In the course of production occur emissions of a harm-
ful pollutant proportionally to the output level. Assume that the pollutant only emerges 
in the industry under consideration. 
Each firm can reduce emissions either by decreasing output or by adopting an end-of-
pipe technology, i.e. implementing a filter system. Thus the individual emissions actu-
ally sent to the environment are ( ) eiieiii vxv,xem −ε= , with the emission coefficient 
0>ε  and the firm specific end-of-pipe abatement effort eiv . The latter causes costs on 
the firm level according to the function ( ) ( ) ( ) 2eieieie v21vuu,vcc ++γ= . The monetary 
value of the damage emanating form the firms’ emissions is captured by the damage 
cost function ( ) ( ) ,EM21EMEMDC 2β+α=  ( )∑= i eiii v,xemEM  denoting the aggregate 
amount of emissions. 
After all, let both the inputs for production and end-of-pipe abatement be produced at 
an exogenously given price on a perfectly competitive market. Thus each firm’s costs 
of production and end of-pipe abatement ( )ixcp  and ( )eie vcc  coincide with the associ-
ated costs incurred by the society. 
                                                 
5
 The basic framework complies with the standard one applied for the comparative analysis of environ-
mental policy instruments; see e.g. Baumol and Oates (1988). The modelling of the uncertainty follows the 
seminal papers of Weitzman (1974) respectively Adar and Griffin (1976). 
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Structure of information 
 
All the functions and specifications of the choice variables listed above are common 
knowledge for the parties involved, with one exception: While the firms are supposed to 
know their true end-of-pipe control cost function, the EPA is uncertain about the latter 
in the following sense: It is fully informed regarding the actual value of γ , against what 
in its eyes u is a random variable.6 All it knows about u is its probability distribution, 
which needs not to be specified for the further analysis. Suppose the expectation of u 
to be [ ] 0uE =  and thus [ ] [ ]2uEuVar = . The uncertainty’s impact on the end-of-pipe con-
trol cost function and the according marginal cost function ( ) ( ) =∂∂= eieieeie vvccu,vmcc  
( ) eivu ++γ  is captured in the subsequent figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Uncertainty’s impact on the (marginal) end-of-pipe control cost function for 0u >  
 
As can be seen easily, the random variable enters ( )u,vmcc eie  additively. This implies 
that the uncertainty solely affects its axis intercept, but not its slope. Figure 1 illustrates 
the progress of ( )u,vcc)m( eie  expected by the policy maker on the one hand )0u( =  
and the true progress on the other hand, assuming for instance that u actually shows a 
positive sign. 
 
Final remarks w.r.t. the modelling 
 
The specification of the demand and cost functions along with the modelling of the un-
certainty is owed to the endeavour of reproducing the basic characteristics of Weitz-
man’s original setting (see Weitzman 1974), which shall be revisited subject to market 
power of the polluting firms. Amongst others, the original setting implies a linear mar-
ginal damage and aggregate control cost function,7 at which the latter is exposed to an 
additive shock. This kind of uncertainty does not only facilitate the exposition, it has 
beyond a considerable economic content, since factor price variations would cause 
additive shocks when firms use a Leontief technology (Adar and Griffin, 1976, pp. 183-
                                                 
6
 Note that not only u itself, but every function entered by u is a random variable. In order to highlight this 
insight, u will be explicitly listed as an argument of these functions. 
7
 For the definition of the marginal aggregate control cost function see sections 4 and 5. 
(marginal) 
costs 
( )u,vcc eie  
( )[ ]u,vccE eie  
( )u,vmcc eie  
( )[ ]u,vmccE eie  
e
iv  
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184). Principally, the uncertainty could have also been modelled by assuming that u 
enters the marginal costs of production in the same way. But it can easily be shown, 
that this does not translate into an additive shock affecting the aggregate marginal con-
trol cost function in case of perfect competition. Except for that, it is not the detailed 
cause of cost uncertainty that matters, but its corporate impact with market power on 
the relative performance of emission standards and taxes. 
 
 
3. Game of policy intervention 
 
Clearly, in the absence of regulation the firms do not have an incentive to render any 
positive abatement effort. So for perfect competition the standard result applies: From a 
welfare perspective the firms’ output as well as emission level is too high, the abate-
ment effort too low. The situation becomes less clear-cut if the firms exhibit market 
power, which is an additional distortion to the external diseconomies of pollution. The 
firms then shorten their output level in order to raise profits, and thus produce ceteris 
paribus too less in aggregate terms. Depending on which of the two countervailing dis-
tortions – external diseconomies vs. output shortage – dominates, the unregulated out-
put and emission level fall short of the first best ones or the other way round. The op-
posite relation applies for the abatement effort.8 
Consequently, the EPA, aiming at welfare maximisation, has a reason to intervene in 
the absence as well as in the presence of market power. An interesting thing to note is 
that in the latter case it will merely be able to enforce a second best solution via stan-
dards or taxes by balancing the two distortions in an optimal way (see Barnett, 1980). 
Yet, the achievement of the first best allocation requires at least two policy instruments 
(Baumol and Oates, 1988, p. 81). 
The procedure of the policy intervention can be described as a sequential (Bayesian) 
game whose timing is depicted in figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Timing of the policy intervention game 
 
First of all, the nature determines the firms’ type, i.e. their cost functions, at which ap-
plies the information structure described above. The EPA, since usually endowed with 
sovereign authority and thus in the position of the Stackelberg-leader, chooses whether 
to implement emission standards or taxes (stage I). Afterwards it specifies – given risk 
neutrality, which is presumed throughout the whole analysis – the design of the chosen 
                                                 
8
 By chance it might be that the two distortions just cancel each other out and therefore the unregulated 
and first best levels coincide. But since this constellation constitutes the great exception it will be neglected 
throughout the further analysis. 
EPA chooses  
the instrument 
EPA specifies the 
instrument’s design 
Firms accept 
(or reject) 
Emission levels 
and pay-offs occur 
t 
Stage I Stage IV Stage III Stage II Stage 0 
Nature determines 
the firms’ type 
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instrument in stage II in order to maximise the expectation of partial welfare. The latter 
is defined as9 
 
[1] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )EMDCu,vccxcpUu,W
i
e
i
e
i i
−−−= ∑∑xvx, e , 
 
and hence supposed to be additively separable into the gross utility of consumption 
( ) ( )dXXpU ∫=x , the aggregate costs of production, end-of-pipe and damage. The 
counterpart of [1] is constituted by the total costs that come along with a specific 
amount of emissions 
 
[2] ( ) ( ) ( )EMDCu,,CCu,,C += ee vxvx , 
 
whereas 
 
[3] ( ) ( ) ( )∑+= i eiex u,vccCCu,,CC xvx e  
 
represents the aggregate control costs and 
 
[4] ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )∑−−−= ∗∗ i ix xcpUxncpUCC xxx ,  ∗∗ <∃≤ xx, ixx  
 
the aggregate control costs w.r.t. the output reduction – the loss of the gross utility of 
consumption excluding the saving of production costs. Remember that owed to the 
firms’ symmetry the individual output in the unregulated equilibrium ∗x  is identical for 
all of them. So the EPA’s maximisation problem can alternatively be stated as to design 
the instruments such that the expectation of [2] is minimised, which will be helpful for 
the further proceeding. 
Next, the EPA offers the pursuant occurrence of standards or taxes in terms of a con-
tract to the firms, whose single decision is to comply with the environmental regulation 
or not – i.e. to accept or reject the contract (stage III). Subsequently, it is taken for 
granted that the EPA can monitor the firms’ emission levels without any costs and en-
force compliance by charging a sufficiently high fine in case that the firms reject.10 So 
any kind of moral-hazard problem can be ruled out and the firms will always accept the 
contract, which enables to skip stage III henceforth. Finally (stage IV), the firms choose 
the output and end-of-pipe abatement level such that their overall compliance costs of 
regulation are minimised. The latter comprise the combined control costs 
 
[5] ( ) ( ) ( )u,vccxccu,v,xcc eieixeii += , 
 
and if applicable additionally the tax burden. There 
 
                                                 
9
 Subsequently, bold print variables denote vectors of firm specific variables. 
10
 To prevent rejection, the fine has to meet at least the firms’ compliance costs referred to the respective 
instrument. As the quantification of the adequate fine yields tedious expressions but no further insight it is 
omitted. 
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[6] ( ) ( ) ( )∗∗∗ pi−pi= eieix v,xv,xxcc ,    0v,xx ei =< ∗∗  
 
indicates a firm’s costs accruing from the emission reduction by decreasing the output 
level below the one of the unregulated equilibrium, which is nothing but the associated 
loss of profit pi , ∗ev  representing the end-of-pipe abatement effort in the absence of 
regulation.11 In opposite to the aggregate end-of-pipe control costs [4] cannot generally 
be calculated by simply summing up the output reduction costs that the firms are con-
fronted with; see section 5. 
Naturally, the game will be solved for the Bayes-Nash equilibrium (short BNE) using 
backwards induction. The present framework neither allows for problems of asymmetric 
information because the firms cannot exploit their advance in information, nor for 
Bayesian updating. The analysis restricts to that BNE which comprises positive output 
and end-of-pipe abatement levels of all the firms (inner solution), since obviously oth-
erwise the end-of-pipe control cost uncertainty would be irrelevant for the optimal in-
strument choice. This kind of inner solution has two implications. Firstly, it requires the 
degree of uncertainty, i.e. the feasible value range of u, to be sufficiently small.12 Sec-
ondly, in the presence of market power the associated output shortage will carry less 
weight than the distortion of pollution, since both a Bayesian perfect standard and tax 
inducing a positive end-of-pipe abatement effort necessarily lead to a decrease of the 
firms’ output compared to the unregulated equilibrium as well. 
 
 
4. Perfect competition 
 
Stage IV 
 
In case of emission standards, which are assumed to be specified in a uniform and 
absolute manner, the EPA prescribes a certain emission level q to be realised by each 
firm.13 So the firms’ responses to q concerning the output and end-of-pipe abatement 
level arise out of the minimisation problem14 
 
[7] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) qv,xem.t.su,vccxccu,v,xccmin eiiieieixPCeiiPC
v,x eii
=+= , where 
( ) ( ) ( )∗∗∗ pi−pi= eiPCePCPCixPC v,xv,xxcc     
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) PCiiiPCPC xx,xcpxpxcpxp ∗∗∗∗∗ <−−−= PCPC xx  
 
with the first order condition15 
 
[8] ( ) ( ) ( )( )qxu,qxccxxcc iieiixPC −ε∂−ε∂ε=∂∂− .     
                                                 
11
 For the concrete specification which depends on the market structure see sections 4 and 5. 
12
 Listing explicitly the parameter restrictions and u’s feasible range of values that guarantee the inner 
solution is very cumbersome but yields no further insights. 
13
 The modus of a uniform absolute emission standard is chosen for two reasons: Firstly, it is the stan-
dards’ prototype which is taken for granted in the respective literature (see Helfand, 1991, p. 622) and thus 
allows for the comparability of results. Secondly, it keeps the model tractable. Note that the basically given 
inherent inefficiency of standards does not arise here due to the symmetry of firms. 
14
 The superscript “PC” marks occurrences of functions and variables specific to perfect competition.  
15
 For the second order condition see appendix A1. 
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Taking into account the demand side one obtains the individual equilibrium quantities 
( )u,qxPC , ( )u,qv ePC  and ( ) qqemPC = . In contrast, having to pay a tax rate t per emis-
sion unit, each firm faces the problem 
 
[9] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )eiiieieixPCeiiieiiPC
v,x
v,xtemu,vccxccv,xtemu,v,xccmin
e
ii
++=+  
 
whose solution is defined by16 
 
[10] ( ) ( ) tvu,vcc;txxcc eieieiixPC =∂∂ε=∂∂− ,     
 
leading to the equilibrium output, end-of-pipe abatement and emission levels ( )txPC , 
( )u,tv ePC  and ( )u,temPC . The firms solve their problem both in the standard and tax 
regime by equating their marginal costs of the two abatement options with regard to 
further restrictions (standards) or payments (taxes). Facing standards, the firms choose 
the output and end-of-pipe level simultaneously in a way that their emissions are ex-
actly and with certainty q – consequently ( )u,qxPC  and ( )u,qv ePC  encounter uncertainty. 
Things are slightly different in case of taxation: Here the firms separately adjust their 
marginal costs of output reduction and end-of-pipe abatement to the tax rate t. Hence 
( )u,tv ePC  and ( )u,temPC  are random while ( )txPC  is deterministic in the EPA’s eyes. 
This difference will drive the circumstance that standards and taxes are not equal to 
one another in the presence of uncertain control costs, as will be seen below. 
 
Stage II 
 
Next the EPA can receive the optimally designed standard and tax by minimising the 
expectation of the total costs over q respectively t subject to the results of stage IV. 
Thus the optimal standard yields from solving 
 
[11] ( ) ( )( )[ ]u,u,qv,u,qxCEmin PCPC
q
e
, 
 
which implies to equate the expectation of the aggregate marginal control costs and the 
marginal damage costs related to an infinitesimal decrease in q:17 
 
[12] ( ) ( )( ) ( )PC
PC
PC
PCePCPCPC
q
nqDC
q
u,u,qv,u,qxCCE
∂
∂
=





∂
∂
− . 
 
Analogously for taxation, the EPA aims at 
 
[13] ( ) ( )( )[ ]u,u,tv,txCEmin PCPC
t
e
, 
 
                                                 
16
 For the second order condition see appendix A2. 
17
 For the second order condition and the explicit solution see appendix A3. 
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by fixing t such that 
 
[14] ( ) ( )( ) ( )PCPC
PCePCPCPC
t
DC
t
u,u,tv,txCCE
∂
⋅∂
−=





∂
∂
.
18
 
 
Finally, the EPA makes its instrument choice by comparing the expected total cost lev-
els accompanied with the optimal tax and standard. The respective cost difference 
amounts to 
 
[15] ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )[ ]u,u,qv,u,qxCu,u,tv,txCE PCPCPCPCPCPCPCPCPC ee −=∆  
      = [ ] 





µ
µ−βφ 22 2uVar , 
          whereas ( ) 2bn1
bn1
ε++
+
=φ  and 22 nbnn
bn1
ε++
+
=µ . 
 
Clearly, [15] suggests that standards should be preferred to taxes whenever PC∆  
shows a positive sign or equivalently µ>β , and vice versa (BNE). 
 
Interpretation 
 
In order to comprehend this policy rule it is first of all needed to identify the single com-
ponents of [15]. For this purpose the two instrument specific first order conditions for 
the minimisation of the total costs [12] and [14] are made comparable by defining the 
aggregate control and damage costs induced by standards and taxes as functions of 
the aggregate abatement effort V, which reads for the case of perfect competition 
EMEM,EMEMV PCPCPC >−= ∗∗ . This is accomplished through computing q and t 
which exactly generate PCV , denoted by ( )PCVq  and ( )u,Vt PC .19 Inserting those into 
[11] and [13] one obtains 
 
[16] ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )u,Vqv,u,VqxDCVDC PCePCPCPCPCq =  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )u,u,Vtv,u,VtxDCVDC PCePCPCPCPCt =  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )u,u,Vqv,u,VqxCCu,VCC PCePCPCPCPCq =  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )u,u,u,Vtv,u,VtxCCu,VCC PCePCPCPCPCt = . 
 
Palpably, it holds that 
 
[17] ( ) ( ) ( )PCPCtPCq VDCVDCVDC ==  
 
 just due to definition – a given overall abatement effort generates the same level of 
damage costs, no matter if induced by standards or taxes. Yet, the finding 
                                                 
18
 For the second order condition and the explicit solution see appendix A4. 
19
 This can be simply done by solving ( ) nqEMqV PCPC −= ∗  for q, respectively ( ) ( )u,tEMEMtV PCPCPC −= ∗  for t. 
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( ) ( )u,VCCu,VCC PCtPCq =  might appear a little astonishing at first sight. But remember-
ing that all the firms are symmetric and equate their marginal costs of the two abate-
ment options at choice, no matter if confronted with standard or tax policy, it is easy to 
see that ( )( ) ( )( )u,Vtxu,Vqx PCPCPCPC =  as soon as ( )( ) ( )( )u,u,Vtvu,Vqv PCePCPCePC =  and 
thus the aggregate control costs coincide for the two instruments at hand.20 
 
As a second important insight, it can be shown that taxes and standards do not only 
lead to identical aggregate control costs, but both also ensure that PCV  is accom-
plished efficiently from an aggregate point of view: 
 
[18] ( ) ( ) ( )u,VCCu,VCCu,VCC PCminPCtPCq == . 
 
Thereby ( )u,VCC PCmin  constitutes the minimised aggregate control cost function, which 
results from solving 
 
[19] ( ) EMEMV.t.su,,CCmin PCPC
,
−=
∗e
vx
vx
e
 
 
and inserting the results into [3]. Minimising the aggregate control costs is tied to the 
following two premises: Firstly, each firm has to render its abatement effort in a socially 
efficient way (intra-firm efficiency). Looking at the two abatement options, it can easily 
be seen that each firm’s marginal costs of a specific abatement effort reflect precisely 
the respective costs accruing on the aggregate level: Under the assumption of a per-
fectly competitive market for the end-of-pipe inputs, the according price and thus the 
(marginal) end-of-pipe control costs exactly report the society’s opportunity costs for 
producing the “end-of-pipe good”. Basically the same applies for the output option: Re-
ducing the output level for one marginal unit leads to costs on the firm level to the 
amount of ( ) ( ) ,xxcppxxcc iiPCiixPC ∂∂−=∂∂− ∗  the equilibrium price reflecting the con-
sumers’ marginal willingness to pay less the associated saving of production costs, 
which corresponds to the costs of that measure incurred by society – the loss of con-
sumers’ and producers’ surplus. Note that the costs of output reduction only exhibit this 
form when the firms are price takers. Since each firm equates its marginal costs of both 
abatement options due to its own ambition of cost minimisation, it automatically mini-
mises the according costs on the social level: ( ) ixPC xCC ε∂⋅∂− ( ) =ε∂⋅∂= ixPC xcc  
( ) eie vcc ∂⋅∂  for ( )u,qxx PCi =  and ( )u,qvv ePCei =  as well as for ( )txx PCi =  and 
( )u,tvv ePCei = . 
Secondly, socially efficient abatement requires that the total emission reduction PCV  is 
distributed in a cost minimising way over the firms, i.e. the aggregate marginal control 
costs associated with the individual abatement efforts of all the firms have to coincide 
(inter-firm efficiency). As shown above, this condition is clearly fulfilled since every firm 
realises the same output and end-of-pipe abatement level for both policy regimes and 
                                                 
20
 Of course, this result depends crucially on the symmetry assumption: Asymmetric firms adopting their 
marginal control costs to the uniform tax rate will inevitably realise different output and end-of-pipe abate-
ment levels compared to the case of a uniform standard. 
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furthermore employs the identical technology: ( ) 1xPC xCC ε∂⋅∂− ( ) ...xCC 2xPC =ε∂⋅∂−=  
( ) nxPC xCC ε∂⋅∂−=  and moreover ( ) =∂⋅∂ e1e vcc ( ) ...vcc e2e =∂⋅∂ ( ) ene vcc ∂⋅∂= , again 
given the quantities occurring in the standard and tax regulated equilibrium. 
Summarising, it can be stated that due to [17] and [18] the problem of determining the 
optimal standard and tax can be alternatively to [11] and [13] posed as 
 
[20] ( )[ ] ( )PCPCmin
V
VDCu,VCCEmin
PC
+ , 
 
implying to adjust the expectation of the minimised aggregate marginal control costs21 
 
[21] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) PC2PC
PCmin
PCmin V
bn1bnb1
ab
u
V
u,VCC
u,VMCC µ+
ε++++
ε
+γ+φ=
∂
∂
=  
 
and the marginal damage costs 
 
[22]  ( ) ( ) ( )PCPCPC
PC
PC VEM
V
VDCVMDC −β+α=
∂
∂
−=
∗
. 
 
In the end, PCq  and PCt  result from plugging the optimal PCV  into ( )PCVq  along with 
( )u,Vt PC  and if appropriate building expectations. 
So obviously the optimal choice of instruments solely depends on the relation between 
the slopes of ( )PCVMDC  and ( )u,VMCC PCmin : Standards shall be preferred to taxes 
when the marginal damage costs run steeper than the minimised aggregate marginal 
control costs, i.e. µ>β , and vice versa. The level of the latter )(φ  as well as the vari-
ance of u indeed determines the magnitude of the difference in total expected costs but 
they play absolutely no role for its sign. As these findings exactly coincide with the pol-
icy rule first derived by Weitzman (1974) it hereby has been proved that the latter holds 
for the more general case of two abatement options. Hence state 
 
Proposition 1: The original Weitzman-rule can be generalised for the case of two 
abatement options. 
 
Thus in the following [15] will be referred to as the generalised original Weitzman-rule. 
The critical question to answer is evidently how this policy rule comes to existence:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 u produces an additive shock w.r.t. the minimised aggregate control cost function which corresponds to 
the original Weitzman-setting. 
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Figure 3: Generalised original Weitzman-rule for 0u >  
 
Figure 3 depicts the first order condition for the optimal standard )q( PC  and tax )t( PC  
contingent on PCV . Both yield from the intersection of ( )PCVMDC  and 
( )[ ]u,VMCCE PCmin . For instance, it is presumed that u is actually positive, i.e. 
( )u,VMCC PCmin  runs above ( )[ ]u,VMCCE PCmin  throughout the relevant value range of 
PCV . PCq  accurately enforces the aggregate abatement effort being optimal in terms of 
expectation ( )PCPC qV . Due to the EPA’s erroneous belief ( )PCPC qV  deviates from the 
first best aggregate abatement effort FBV  which equates ( )u,VMCC PCmin  with 
( )PCVMDC . The resulting welfare loss or overall cost saving potential shows as 
 
[23] ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ,dVVMDCu,VMCCu,qdwl
PCPC
FB
qV
V
PCPCPCminPC
∫ −=  
 
corresponding to the dark shaded area. By contrast, the firms’ response to the optimal 
tax ( )u,tV PCPC  differs from the response expected by the EPA, ( )PCPC qV , since the 
firms align their true marginal control costs with PCt . Again, the total costs are not 
minimised, since ( )PCVMDC  and ( )u,VMCC PCmin  fall apart. This time the respective wel-
fare loss reads 
 
[24] ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
,dVu,VMCCVMDCu,tdwl
FB
PCPC
V
u,tV
PCPCminPCPC
∫ −=  
 
which is congruent to the light shaded area. Apparently, the policy recommendation of 
the generalised original Weitzman-rule is approved by the graphical analysis: Provided 
that the marginal damage costs run steeper than the aggregate marginal control costs 
PCV  
marginal 
costs 
( )PCVMDC  
 
( )[ ]u,VMCCE PCmin  
 
( )u,VMCC PCmin  
 
a) µβ >  
PCt  
FBV  ( )u,tV PCPC  ( )PCPC qV  
PCV  
marginal 
costs 
( )PCVMDC
 
( )[ ]u,VMCCE PCmin  
 
( )u,VMCC PCmin  
 
b) µβ <  
PCt  
FBV  ( )u,tV PCPC  ( )PCPC qV  
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)( µ>β  like depicted in figure 3a, it holds that ( ) ( )u,tdwlu,qdwl PCPC <  and thus stan-
dards should be preferred to taxes: In case of µ  being relatively small, already an in-
significant error of the EPA –  the true u only slightly deviates from zero – leads to a 
rather large difference between FBV  and ( )u,tV PCPC . Since moreover the damage costs 
react sensitively to variations of the aggregate abatement effort owed to a relatively 
large occurrence of β , PCV  should be controlled in a preferably accurate way, which 
can solely be accomplished through standard policy. 
The economic intuition for the superiority of taxes, ( ) ( )u,tdwlu,qdwl PCPC > , when µ<β  
– see figure 3b – becomes clearest by conceiving the extreme case of a horizontal 
marginal damage cost function )0( =β . Here the EPA can enforce the first best aggre-
gate abatement effort despite its lack of information by simply adjusting the tax rate to 
the axis intercept of the marginal damage costs α . The cost minimising firms will then 
for sure generate FBV , against what the optimal standard still fails at full internalisation. 
This advantage of the tax policy persists as long as µ<β . Note that the sign of the 
instrument specific welfare losses’ difference applies for any allowed occurrence of u 
and consequently as well for the expected difference as a whole. 
 
 
5. Symmetric Cournot oligopoly 
 
Stage IV 
 
Facing standard policy, each oligopolist solves22 
 
[25] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) qv,xem.t.su,vccxccu,v,xccmin eiiieieixCeiiC
v,x eii
=+= , where 
          ( ) ( ) ( )∗∗∗ pi−pi= eiCeCCixC v,xv,xxcc  
                       
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) CiiiiCCCC xx,xcpxxx1npxcpxp ∗∗∗∗∗ <−+−−−= x  
 
by setting the output and end-of-pipe abatement level such that 
 
[26] ( ) ( ) ( )( )qxu,qxccxxcc iieiixC −ε∂−ε∂ε=∂∂−  
 
with identical meaning as [8]. Taking further into account that by reason of symmetry 
the equilibrium quantities will be the same for all the firms and employing the Cournot 
conjecture, one obtains the output, end-of-pipe abatement and emission level of the 
standard regulated Cournot-Nash-Equilibrium (short CNE) ( )u,qxC , ( )u,qv eC  and  
( ) qqemC = .23 
 
Under the tax regime, the firms’ minimisation problem turns out to be 
                                                 
22
 The superscript “C” marks occurrences of functions and variables specific to symmetric Cournot oligop-
oly. 
23
 For the second order condition, the existence and uniqueness of the standard regulated CNE see ap-
pendix A5. 
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[27] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )eiiieieixCeiiieiiC
v,x
v,xtemu,vccxccv,xtemu,v,xccmin
e
ii
++=+ , 
with the familiar first order condition 
 
[28] ( ) ( ) tvu,vcc;txxcc eieieiixC =∂∂ε=∂∂− . 
 
The computation of the CNE under taxation produces ( )txC , ( )u,tv eC  and ( )u,temC .24 
Again, the minimisation of the firms’ costs implies in both regimes to combine the two 
abatement options in a way that balances the respective marginal costs. The firms 
hereby explicitly take into account their influence on the equilibrium price. Like under 
perfect competition, they choose the output and end-of-pipe abatement level in two 
separate steps when facing taxation. This implies the output level to be the sole chan-
nel of strategic interaction and to be deterministic in equilibrium, against what the equi-
librium end-of-pipe abatement and emission level are random from the EPA’s perspec-
tive. Contrary, in the standard regulated CNE the amount of emissions is certain, while 
the output as well as the end-of-pipe abatement level is a function of u and beyond 
subject to strategic interaction, as the firms here fix ix  and eiv  simultaneously. 
 
Stage II 
 
Minimising the expectation of the instrument specific total costs and anticipating the 
firms’ equilibrium responses of stage IV results in the optimal instruments’ designs. 
Thus, when implementing standards the EPA aspires to 
 
[29] ( ) ( )( )[ ]u,u,qv,u,qxCEmin CC
q
e
. 
 
The optimal standard satisfies25 
 
[30] ( ) ( )( ) ( )C
C
C
CeCCC
q
nqDC
q
u,u,qv,u,qxCCE
∂
∂
=





∂
∂
− . 
 
In case of taxation, the EPA’s programme and the associated first order condition 
read26 
 
[31] ( ) ( )( )[ ]u,u,tv,txCEmin CC
t
e
 and 
 
[32] ( ) ( )( ) ( )CC
CeCCC
t
DC
t
u,u,tv,txCCE
∂
⋅∂
−=





∂
∂
. 
 
                                                 
24
 For the second order condition, the existence and uniqueness of the tax regulated CNE see appendix 
A6. 
25
 For the second order condition and the explicit solution see appendix A7. 
26
 For the second order condition and the explicit solution see appendix A8. Furthermore it can be shown 
that the optimal tax is below the Pigou-level, which is owed to the additional distortion of market power and 
corresponds to the standard result of Barnett (1980). 
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Stage I 
 
Given the market structure of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, the difference in the opti-
mally designed instruments’ expected total cost levels turns out to be 
 
[33] ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]u,u,qv,u,qxCu,u,tv,txCE CCCCCCCCC ee −=∆  
      [ ]








µ
µ−βφ= 2C
C
2C
2
uVar , 
      at which ( ) ( )( ) φ>ε+++
ε++++
=φ 22
22
C
bnb1
bn1bnb1
 and 
        
( ) ( )
( ) µ>ε+++
ε++++
=µ 22
22
C
bnb1n
bn1bnb1
.
27
 
 
Palpably, C∆  exhibits the same structure as PC∆ . However Cφ  and Cµ , whose meaning 
will be revealed below, replace φ  and µ . Thus, standards are superior to taxes for 
0C >∆  or equivalently Cµ>β  and vice versa (BNE). 
 
Interpretation 
 
The reason for the discrepancy between C∆  and PC∆  as well as the accompanied 
modification of the policy rule becomes clear in turn by scrutinising the first order condi-
tions for Cq  and Ct : Just like in the case of perfect competition, the solution of [29] and 
[31] prescribes to choose q and t such that the marginal damage costs and the ex-
pected aggregate marginal control costs coming along with each instrument are bal-
anced. Once more the instruments’ first order conditions can be made comparable by 
restating the associated damage and aggregate control costs in dependence of 
,EMEMV CC −= ∗  EMEM C >∗  – the overall abatement effort relating to the Cournot 
oligopoly. Therefore plug ( )CVq and ( )u,Vt C 28 into [29] and [31], which produces 
 
[34] ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )u,Vqv,u,VqxDCVDC CeCCCCq =  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )u,u,Vtv,u,VtxDCVDC CeCCCCt =  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )u,u,Vqv,u,VqxCCu,VCC CeCCCCq =  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )u,u,u,Vtv,u,VtxCCu,VCC CeCCCCt = . 
 
Due to the firms’ symmetry it holds that ( ) ( ) ( )CCtCq VDCVDCVDC ==  and 
( ) =u,VCC Cq ( )u,VCC Ct . The reasoning for these equivalences is exactly the same as 
in section 4. However, there is one crucial difference relative to perfect competition 
which drives the modification of the generalised original Weitzman-rule. Looking at the 
                                                 
27
 For the proof of these relations see appendix A9. 
28
 These result from solving ( ) nqEMqV CC −= ∗  for q respectively ( ) ( )u,tEMEMtV CCC −= ∗  for t. ( )u,Vt C  
simply complies with the horizontal aggregation of the firms’ marginal control costs because of [28]. 
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oligopolists’ marginal control costs of output reduction, it can be seen easily that these 
only capture a part of the corresponding costs occurring on the social level: The former 
– which are merely the loss of profit resulting from an infinitesimal decrease of the out-
put level – amount to (w.r.t. the Cournot conjecture): 
 
[35] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i
ii
i
e
i
C
i
i
xC
x
xcp
xMR
x
v,x
x
xcc
∂
∂
−=
∂
pi∂
=
∂
∂
−
∗
 
whereas ( ) ( )( )( )
i
ii
C
ii
x
xxx1np
xMR
∂
+−∂
=
∗
 
 
depicts the (residual) marginal revenue of firm i, given the equilibrium quantities of all 
the other firms. Now consider the respective aggregate costs of a firm’s marginal out-
put decrease, which are relevant for the EPA when calculating the instruments’ optimal 
design: 
 
[36] 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) .
x
xcp
xx1np
x
xcpxx1nU
x
xx1nCC
i
i
i
C
i
n
1i
ii
C
i
i
CxC
∂
∂
−+−=
=
∂






−+−∂
=
∂
+−∂
−
∗
=
∗
∗ ∑
 
 
[36] reflects the impact of a marginal output reduction on the partial welfare, namely the 
resultant loss of the consumers’ and producers’ surplus, which complies with the differ-
ence of the marginal willingness to pay (respectively the residual demand for firm i) and 
the marginal saving of production costs. The relation between the marginal costs of 
output reduction emerging on the firm and aggregate level is illustrated in figure 4: 
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Figure 4: Marginal costs of output reduction on the firm and aggregate level 
 
Naturally, for a linear demand function, the (residual) marginal revenue runs below the 
(residual) marginal willingness to pay, as shown in figure 4a. So it becomes evident 
that a firm’s marginal output decrease causes lower costs on the firm than on the ag-
gregate level by opposing [35] to [36].29 This is visualised in figure 4b, where the firm’s 
and the aggregate marginal costs are derived out of the difference between the mar-
ginal revenue respectively the marginal willingness to pay and the marginal costs of 
production.30 When faced with standard or tax policy, each firm equals its marginal 
costs of the two abatement options and thus hinders the aggregate control costs from 
being minimised, i.e. the intra-firm efficiency is hurt: ( ) ixC xCC ε∂⋅∂− ( ) ixC xcc ε∂⋅∂>  
( ) eie vcc ∂⋅∂=  for ( )u,qxx Ci =  and ( )u,qvv eCei =  as well as for ( )txx Ci =  and 
( )u,tvv eCei = .31 Consequently 
 
Proposition 2: Both the optimal standard Cq  and the optimal tax Ct  fail to enforce the 
first best allocation in terms of expectation. 
 
                                                 
29
 For the proof see appendix A10. 
30
 However, the end-of-pipe abatement option leads ceteris paribus still to the same marginal costs from 
the firms’ and from the aggregate point of view. 
31
 Though, the inter-firm efficiency condition is still fulfilled with the reasoning familiar from the case of 
perfect competition. 
ix  
( )( )iC xx1np +− ∗  
( )ii xMR  
( ) ii xxcp ∂∂  ( ) ixcp ∂⋅∂  
( )⋅iMR  ( )⋅p  
Cx ∗  
Cx ∗  
ix  
( ) ixC xCC ∂∂− x  
( ) iixC xxcc ∂∂−  
( ) ixC xCC ∂⋅∂−  
( ) ixC xcc ∂⋅∂−  
a) 
b) 
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Due to the relation between the firms’ and the aggregate marginal costs of output re-
duction revealed above, the firms abate too much via the output option and too less via 
end-of-pipe: They abuse their market power to shift a part of the control costs upon the 
consumers. Therefore the aggregate control costs realisable in case of standard or tax 
policy are higher than the minimised aggregate control costs: ( ) =u,VCC Cq  
( ) >u,VCC Ct ( )u,VCC Cmin  within CV ’s feasible range of values for the inner solution.32 
As a matter of course, it is the realisable aggregate marginal control cost function33 
 
[37] 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) CC2C
C
Ct
C
Cq
CC
V
bnb1bnb1
ab
u
V
u,VCC
V
u,VCC
:u,VMCC
µ+
ε+++++
ε
+γ+φ=
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
=
 
 
whose expectation has to be equated with the marginal damage costs for the optimal 
instruments’ design. So necessarily the former’s slope Cµ  and level parameter Cφ  en-
ter the modified Weitzman-rule. Opposing [37] to [21] reveals that realisable aggregate 
marginal control cost function runs on a higher level but exhibits a smaller slope com-
pared to the minimised one.34 To recapitulate set up 
 
Proposition 3: Against the background of uncertain control costs and a polluting sym-
metric Cournot oligopoly standards are superior to taxes when the marginal damage 
costs run steeper than realisable aggregate marginal control costs and vice versa. 
 
After all, the modified Weitzman-rule can in turn be visualized graphically: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Modified Weitzman-rule for 0u >  
 
                                                 
32
 As the handling of the parameter restrictions which guarantee the inner solution is very cumbersome but 
yields no further insights, the proof is neglected. 
33
 Note that u produces an additive shock to ( )u,VMCC CC  as well. 
34
 The causes for this relation are rather technical and thus not exposed in detail at this point. For this 
purpose see appendix A11 which also contains the proof. 
b) Cµβ <  
CV  
( )CVMDC
 
( )[ ]u,VMCCE CC  
 
( )u,VMCC CC  
 
Ct  
SBV  ( )u,tV C  ( )CqV  
marginal 
costs 
 
( )[ ]u,VtE C  
 
( )u,Vt C  
 
a) Cµβ >  
CV
marginal 
costs 
 
( )CVMDC
 
( )[ ]u,VtE C  
 
( )u,VMCC CC  
 
Ct
( )u,tV CC  ( )CC qV
( )u,Vt C  
 
SBV
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Figure 5 illustrates the welfare implications of the optimal standard and tax for the ex-
emplary case of u being actually larger than zero. As demonstrated above, Cq  and Ct  
balance the marginal damage and the expected aggregate marginal control costs real-
isable for the EPA. Seeing that the aggregate abatement effort can be accurately con-
trolled by standards, ( )CC qV  is determined out of the intersection between 
( )[ ]u,VMCCE CC  and ( )CVMDC . Clearly due to the EPA’s erroneous belief, ( )CC qV  de-
viates from the second best aggregate abatement level SBV , which equates the true 
realisable aggregate marginal control costs and the marginal damage costs. Remem-
ber that owed to the additional distortion of market power, neither standards nor taxes 
succeed in generating the first best allocation for which reason SBV  has to serve as 
reference point for the comparative analysis of instruments. So the welfare loss in-
duced by the optimal standard is congruent to the dark shaded area in figure 5 and can 
be computed as follows: 
 
[38] ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )∫ −=
CC
SB
qV
V
CCCCC
.dVVMDCu,VMCCu,qdwl  
 
As the firms’ and the aggregate marginal control costs diverge, of course Ct  does not 
correspond to the level of ( )[ ]u,VMCCE CC  and ( )CVMDC  in their intersection. It is in 
fact obtained by inserting ( )CC qV , the aggregate abatement effort which is expected to 
be optimal, into the expectation of ( )u,Vt C , the horizontal aggregation of the firms’ 
marginal control costs.35 Of course, given that the firms’ true costs do not coincide with 
the EPA’s expectation, the emerging abatement effort is ( )u,tV CC , which deviates from 
the second best level as well. This time the arising welfare loss is 
 
[39] ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )∫
−=
SB
CC
V
u,tV
CCCCC
,dVu,VMCCVMDCu,tdwl  
 
corresponding to the light shaded area in figure 5. When the marginal damage costs 
run steeper than realisable overall marginal control costs, i.e. Cµ>β , it holds that 
( ) ( )u,tdwlu,qdwl CC <  as illustrated in figure 5a.36 As this is the case for every possible 
value of u unequal to zero, the expected welfare loss of standards is smaller than the 
one induced by taxation as well and thus standards are the optimal choice. For 
Cµ<β results the opposite policy recommendation, as can be seen from figure 5b. The 
economic intuition behind the modified Weitzman-rule exactly corresponds to the one 
behind the original rule. 
 
                                                 
35
 Since as proved in appendix A10 the firms’ marginal costs of output reduction run steeper than the as-
sociated aggregate marginal costs but exhibit a lower level, the same relation necessarily applies for 
( )u,Vt C  and ( )u,VMCC CC . 
36
 Note that the slopes of ( )u,VMCC CC  and ( )u,Vt C are positively correlated because they are determined 
by the same parameters entering in the identical direction; see appendix A12 for the proof. 
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6. Degree of market power and optimal instrument choice 
 
Conceive the EPA would base its decision upon the generalised original Weitzman-rule 
despite the polluting firms constitute a symmetric Cournot oligopoly, and thus imple-
ment standard instead of tax policy whenever µ>β  and vice versa. However as shown 
above, standards are only superior to taxes if Cµ>β . Since µ>µC , the EPA chooses 
standards by mistake, i.e. although taxes would generate the higher expected welfare 
level, whenever µ>β>µC . Yet, it is straightforward to realise that because of µ>µC  
an aberrant implementation of taxes instead of standards is never possible. Summarise 
this finding as 
 
Proposition 4: Applying the generalised original Weitzman-rule despite market power 
of the polluting firms comprises the risk of a suboptimal instrument choice, which solely 
contains a falsely implementation of standards. 
 
Obviously, this risk grows with increasing size of the interval [ ]C;µµ , which is µ−µC . 
Taking into account that both µ  and Cµ  are functions of the firms’ number n it can eas-
ily be shown that37 
 
[40] ( ) ( )( ) 0
n
nnC
<
∂
µ−µ∂
. 
 
Consequently applies 
 
Proposition 5: The risk of the suboptimal instrument choice described in proposition 4 
grows with decreasing number of the firms and thus increasing degree of market 
power. 
 
Finally bear in mind 
 
Proposition 6: The modified Weitzman-rule for a symmetric Cournot oligopoly can be 
adapted to the case of a monopolistic polluter. 
 
For this purpose simply set 1n =  within [33]: 
 
[41] ( )1nCM =∆=∆ .38 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In almost every actual emission control setting the environmental policy agency (EPA) 
is confronted with two kinds of complications appearing simultaneously: On the one 
                                                 
37
 The causes for this finding are rather technical and thus not exposed in detail at this point. For this pur-
pose see appendix A13 which also contains the proof. 
38
 The superscript “M” marks variables and functions specific to a monopolistic market structure. 
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hand, the polluting firms nearly always exhibit at least some market power, on the other 
hand, the EPA is indeed never equipped with all the information it needs for reaching 
the full resolution of distortions with environmental policy instruments. Thereby informa-
tion problems focus particularly on firms’ cost functions. Environmental economic the-
ory so far has admittedly detected that both complications influence the optimal design 
and choice of conventional instruments, however to date it failed to analyse their mu-
tual impact. 
The present paper takes a first step in overcoming this default. It analyses the welfare 
properties of emission standards and taxes within a static partial framework against the 
background of uncertain emission control costs from the EPA’s perspective and as-
sumes concurrently that the polluting firms constitute a symmetric Cournot oligopoly. 
The main insight is that these two complications in fact interact. Hence the existent 
policy rule, originally derived by Weitzman (1974) under the premise of perfect compe-
tition, which tells whether to choose standards or taxes when control costs are uncer-
tain, might give wrong advice when firms possess market power. Beyond generalising 
the original Weitzman-rule for two abatement options, the paper provides a modified 
rule which is based on a different concept of aggregate control costs and guarantees 
the optimal choice of instruments in the case of a symmetric Cournot oligopoly. Fur-
thermore it is shown, that the EPA’s risk of choosing the wrong instrument when stick-
ing to the generalised original Weitzman-rule in the Cournot setting grows with increas-
ing degree of market power. At last, the modified policy rule contains the adequate pol-
icy recommendations for the special case of a monopolistic polluter. 
As a matter of course, the specificity of the model demands caution in adopting these 
findings to any actual regulation scenario. Yet, Weitzman (1974) weakened this caveat 
by arguing that the presumed linearity of the aggregate marginal control cost and dam-
age cost function allows for interpreting the results as an approximation for more gen-
eral functions – provided that the feasible value range of the random variable is suffi-
ciently small. For a critical discussion of that point see Malcomson (1978) and Weitz-
man (1978). 
Clearly, there are much more combinations of information problems and market forms 
left which could serve as basis for the comparative analysis of conventional environ-
mental policy instruments. Though, future research should especially focus on those 
combinations which promise essentially new interdependencies between the complica-
tions under regard. For instance, removing the assumption of symmetric firms would 
introduce the allocative inefficiency of production which probably affects the optimal 
environmental policy vitally. The same applies for markets featuring price competition, 
which is well known to exhibit a completely different dimension of strategic interaction. 
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Appendices 
 
Some of the results listed below presume the parameter restrictions guaranteeing the 
inner solution. However, as the handling of the latter is very cumbersome but yields no 
further insights the respective proofs will be neglected. 
 
 
Appendix A1: Firms’ second order condition in case of standards (perfect com-
petition) 
 
As the Hessian of the Lagrangian associated with [7] 
 
 





=
10
01
HqPC  
 
is strictly positive definite, [8] defines a global minimum. 
 
 
Appendix A2: Firms’ second order condition in case of taxes (perfect competi-
tion) 
 
As the Hessian of the firms’ overall compliance costs under taxation 
 
 





=
10
01
HtPC  
 
is strictly positive definite, [10] defines a global minimum. 
 
 
Appendix A3: Optimal standard – second order condition and explicit solution 
(perfect competition) 
 
Since the expectation of the total costs is strictly convex in q, i.e. 
 
 
( )[ ] ( )( )( ) 0
bn1
nn1bn1n
q
CE
2
2
2
2
>
ε++
βε+β++
=
∂
⋅∂
, 
 
the optimal standard 
  
( )( )
( )( ) 2
2
PC
nn1bn1
abn1q βε+β++
αε−ε+α−γ+
=  
PCem;0 ∗∈  for the inner solution 
 
yields a global minimum of the former. 
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Appendix A4: Optimal tax – second order condition and explicit solution (perfect 
competition) 
 
Since the expectation of the total costs is strictly convex in t, i.e. 
 
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) 0bn1
nn1bn1bn1n
t
CE
2
22
2
2
>
+
βε+β++ε++
=
∂
⋅∂
, 
 
the optimal tax 
 
 
( )( )
( )( ) 2
PC
nn1bn1
annbn1t βε+β++
βε+α+βγ+
=  
 
yields a global minimum of the former. 
 
 
Appendix A5: Properties of the standard regulated CNE 
 
The second order condition of [25] is fulfilled because the Hessian of the associated 
Lagrangian  
  





 +
=
10
0b21
HqC  
 
is strictly positive definite. Beyond, the existence and uniqueness of the standard regu-
lated CNE apply since the firms’ response functions concerning output and end-of-pipe 
abatement are linear and decreasing in the rivals’ output: 
 
 ( ) ( ) i22ii Xb1
b
b1
qua
u,q,Xrx
−−
ε++
−
ε++
−γ+ε−
=  
  
( ) ( )( ) i22iei Xb1
b
b1
q)b1(ua
u,q,Xrv
−−
ε++
ε
−
ε++
+−γ+ε−ε
=  
 
 
Appendix A6: Properties of the tax regulated CNE 
 
Considering the Hessian of the firms’ compliance costs under taxation  
 
 




 +
=
10
0b21
HtC  
 
and the response functions of the firms 
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( ) iii Xb1
b
b1
tat,Xrx
−−
+
−
+
ε−
=  
 
( )
δ
γ−−
=
ut
u,trv ei  
 
yields the same results as A5. 
 
 
Appendix A7: Optimal standard – second order condition and explicit solution 
(Cournot oligopoly) 
 
Due to 
 
 
( )[ ] ( )
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bnn
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bnnbbn
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22
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2
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the expectation of the total costs is strictly convex in q which is why the optimal stan-
dard 
 
=
Cq ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 422
22222
nbn1bnb1n2n1bnb1
bnb1bn1bnb1n2b1a
βε+++β++ε+β+++
ε+++α−ε−+++γ+ε+++ε
 
Cem;0 ∗∈  for the inner solution 
 
yields a global minimum of the former. 
 
 
Appendix A8: Optimal tax – second order condition and explicit solution (Cour-
not oligopoly) 
 
Due to 
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the expectation of the total costs is strictly convex in t which is why the optimal tax 
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yields a global minimum of the former. 
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Appendix A9: Cφ  vs. φ  and Cµ  vs. µ  
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Appendix A10: Firms’ vs. aggregate marginal costs of output reduction 
 
The difference between the marginal costs of output reduction occurring on the aggre-
gate and the firm level is strictly positive within the relevant range of values concerning 
the output quantity: 
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Appendix A11: Minimised vs. realisable aggregate marginal control costs 
 
Comparing ( )u,VMCC Cmin  and ( )u,VMCC CC  yields 
 
w.r.t. the level 
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0>  for the inner solution; 
 
w.r.t. the slope 
 
0C <µ−µ , see A9. 
 
So ( )u,VMCC Cmin  runs on a higher level opposite to ( )u,VMCC CC  but exhibits a smaller 
slope. The causes for this relation become clear through contemplating the progression 
of the associated overall control cost functions within CV ’s feasible value range for the 
inner solution: 
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Figure 6: Minimised vs. instruments’ aggregate control costs 
 
At first recall that both standards and taxes hurt the intra-firm efficiency condition and 
thus the aggregate control costs induced by standards and taxes run above the mini-
mised ones. 
The crux for ( )u,VMCC CC  to grow faster than ( )u,VMCC Cmin , i.e. µ>µC , is the follow-
ing: As demonstrated in figure 4, the gap between the aggregate marginal control costs 
w.r.t. output shortage and the firms’ costs shrinks with increasing abatement effort. 
Thus, the higher CV , the less impact has the abatement inefficiency coming along with 
standards and taxes. Consequently, the instruments’ and the minimised aggregate 
control costs converge as CV  tends to ,EM C∗  the maximal overall abatement effort. 
This in turn has two kinds of implications: Firstly, the minimised cost function runs 
steeper than the instruments’ cost function and thus necessarily ( )u,VMCC Cmin  pos-
sesses a higher level than ( )u,VMCC CC . Secondly, the convergence of the cost func-
tions requires that their slopes assimilate as well for growing CV  and so µ>µC . 
 
 
Appendix A12: Relation between the slopes of ( )u,VMCC CC  and ( )u,Vt C  
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Appendix A13: Number of firms and the deviation between Cµ  and µ  
 
Consider the impact of the firms’ number n on the intra-firm efficiency of abatement 
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Clearly, as n decreases each firm gains more market power and thus passes a greater 
share of the control costs on to consumers by abating relatively more through output 
shortage and relatively less through end-of-pipe. Therefore, the intra-firm inefficiency, 
i.e. the gap between the aggregate marginal costs of each firm’s output reduction and 
end-of-pipe abatement effort grows. This in turn entails an augmentation of the differ-
ence between the aggregate control costs induced by standards and taxes and the 
minimised ones within CV ’s feasible range of values w.r.t. the inner solution (see figure 
6, A11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Minimised vs. instruments’ aggregate control costs with varying number of firms 
aggregate control costs induced by standards and taxes 
minimised aggregate control costs 
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aggregate 
control costs 
CEM∗
 
CV
aggregate 
control costs 
a) n firms b) nm <  firms 
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These two cost functions converge as CV  tends to CNEM∗  (which is positively corre-
lated with n) as well in case of a smaller number of firms nm < , for the same causes 
exposed in A11, leading immediately to the following two corollaries: Firstly, for given 
CV  the relative slope of the minimised aggregate control cost function and the instru-
ments’ cost function raises, i.e. the difference in the levels of the associated marginal 
cost functions goes up, with decreasing n: 
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Secondly, as the convergence of the cost functions implies that their slopes assimilate, 
a larger difference in the levels of the marginal cost functions requires that the relative 
slope of the marginal overall cost function induced by standards and taxes and the 
minimised one µµC  accretes when n falls: 
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